Corruption, while relatively small by African standards, is becoming a major problem, in part because of the meager financial resources Somaliland has to begin with. Remittances from abroad (estimated at $250-$500 million annually) have greatly helped the reconstruction effort. But with a budget of only $25 million per year, Hargeisa has not been able to rebuild, much less improve, existing infrastructure. Recognition would bring the aid necessary to do this.

Riyale’s government has struggled to reverse the crippling poverty (fueled in part by Saudi Arabia’s ban on Somali livestock) in the country. In recent years, Somaliland has absorbed thousands of refugees that have returned from Ethiopia and other countries. In addition, the addiction of thousands of Somalilanders to khat poses a serious long term problem for Somaliland’s economy.

Some have questioned the viability of Somaliland as an independent country. The peace, stability, economic climate and political developments of the past fourteen years demonstrate that Somaliland can stand as an independent nation, and it should be recognized as such. However, while some western nations (notably Britain) are sympathetic to Somaliland, its claims to independence continue to be vigorously challenged by the remnants of Somalia, the Arab League, and some African countries.

In October 2004, a Somali reconciliation conference (the 14th since 1991) in Kenya elected Abdullahi Yusuf to lead Somalia. Yusuf will head a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for the next five years. The choice of Yusuf as Somalia’s president disappointed Somalilanders. Yusuf, the former President of the autonomous Puntland region, had been engaged with clashes with Hargeisa over Somaliland’s eastern Sanaag and Sool regions. Indeed, within days of Yusuf’s ascencion to power, Somaliland and Puntland forces engaged in bloody clashes over the border.

The Republic of Somaliland asserted its independence, without any international recognition but it has political relationships with many Western countries including with the AU and the EU.

It is highly unlikely that Somaliland will even consider rejoining Somalia so long as Yusuf is in power. Moreover, with each passing day, the chaos that continues to reign in Somalia makes it unlikely that Somaliland will ever rejoin Somalia.

Dahir Riyale Kahin - pressing for world's recognition of Somaliland

The "borders" of Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland

Map of Somaliland

Culture and ethnicity are linked. Modernist, Ernest Gellner in “Nations and Nationalism” state that blood, language, and historical ties are not important. Rather, the idea that we want to live together is more relevant. I have to advocate Gellner’s modernist view. I agree that people must want to live together; otherwise the struggle for new lines to be drawn or for independence resurrects itself. Take a look at Somaliland where clans formed a “nation,” Gellner is essential to nationalism and his literature is the bible of the modernist This self declared republic has few discernable cultural, ethnic, linguistic or religious differences, the usual markers hiving one group off from another, between those wishing to secede and those in the state of being divorced.

Historically, the clan system enabled Somali people to form their own independent governing structures or even their own traditional states. Historical or traditional polities are outcomes of highly complex co-evolution of clan systems, social norms and pastoral society. This evolutionary process however must have been unequal in the areas inhabited by Somali people. For instance, recorded evidence that some areas in Somalia had a very advanced governing structures (Sultanates / Kingdoms in Obbio, Hafun, Taleeh, Hadaftimo and  Hargeisa) while other areas remained less developed or under Arab Sultanates. (Some of these are mentioned in Luigi Bricchetti Robecchi’s Journeys in the Somali Country1890-91 ). Today however, there is empirical evidence of similar patterns of emergence of traditional polities in the nation that was Somali Democratic Republic. (Puntland and Somaliland).

The emergence of alternative polities in Puntland and Somaliland after the collapse of Somalia is very important to understand. Both Puntland and Somaliland constitute the re-emergence of traditional independent (or quasi independent states) in contemporary Somalia. This does not mean that I particularly support or justify the legitimacy of any but a mere practical truth on the ground one that must be understood for what it is and even used to foster stability in  southern Somalia.

Today’s regional authorities or regional polities are based on collective conventions and pacts achieved through clan systems. They also offer diverse and alternative institutional arrangements to cope with the failure of the former Somali Democratic Republic.

However to make use of any diversity of institutions, I attempted to dissect, understand analyze and attempt to replicate the process that leads groups to organize and eventual formation of regional polities.

It is equally important to acknowledge that these two northern states came to being and continue to exist practically with no support from the international community. (This is particularly true in case of Puntland). On the other hand,   the international community, (primarily the UN) spent an enormous effort and material in constituting a central government for the entire country that was Somalia. Many of these attempts failed and the last attempt to constitute a central authority for Somalia is on life support.

Puntland and Somaliland, for instance, employed diverse institutional arrangements, that included civic organizations, former security forces, intellectuals, extensive of clan based discussions (led by traditional clan elders) to form a collective pact to govern their affairs. This created Puntland in 1998 and Somaliland earlier in 1992.

Though not conclusive, there is compelling evidence that it is highly likely that today’s Puntland (and to some extent Somaliland) are historical outcomes or contingencies of the local traditions to self-governance that predate modern day Somalia.

Today’s Puntland for instance is made of several traditional sultanates that existed in the area prior to the colonial era. It is this long tradition of self reliance and local administration that enabled these regions to constitute functional authorities. It certainly is not random chance that the both Puntland and Somaliland have emerged while many other peaceful remained trapped and eventually consumed by the Somali Civil War.

As in the pre-colonial era, the success of clan sanctioned agreements have become empirical reality and a solid ground that can ascertain a respected representative authority; indeed clan sanctioned agreements are empirically grounded accomplishments that endogenously bring people together – just as it were in the pre-colonial era but perhaps with a modern twist of quasi-state entity.  Both Somaliland and Puntland are exemplary empirical evidence of how an authority is distributed to sub-clans through a bottom up functional organs nominated by the clan orders or projected by them.

Robert Jackson, former U.S. Attorney General

Robert Jackson pioneered the term “new sovereignty game: in which he identifies two main distinctions in the post 1945 world. (1) Rules can acquire independence or statehood solely in virtue of being successors of colonial government rather than having to demonstrate the ability to govern. (2) Weak states may no longer be deprived of their sovereignty through colonialism, conquest of partition. Accordingly, the new sovereignty game created a large number of quasi states – states that lack most capabilities protecting sovereignty, yet which have the same rights as all other state because of the principle of juridical equality of states.

The new sovereignty game created a second type of state: the de factor state. The same principle which uphold quasi states also prevent the acceptance of other groups regardless of how legitimate their grievances, how broad their popular support, or how effective their governance. It is evident that the new sovereignty regime has given birth to both quasi states and de facto states. In sum, quasi states have recognition but lacks capabilities and de facto states have capabilities but lacks recognition.

United Nations

After exploring eastern Europe and trying to find their common link – I have to ask, how much does UN (member states) recognition matter? When we consider examples of recognition of other new states and de-facto states, we see that:- the state of Israel does not have official relations with nearly thirty UN member states; Cyprus is not recognised by Turkey. When analysing further realities of the emerging independence of new states and de-facto states, more examples abound. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Turkish Cypriots) declared independence in 1983. It is recognised by the UN member state Turkey, and since 1979 has been granted observer status with the Organization fo Islamic Conference (OIC).

I do not believe that existence, recognition and independence of viable states depend necessarily on membership in the UN. The most recent example of independence is that of Kosovo, which declared independence from a UN member state, Serbia. It is to be noted that Kosovo’s independence was recognised by three permanent members of the UN Security Council and by many other Western countries, signalling more hope and encouragement to people who are struggling for freedom on the basis of their right to self-determination, an important legal principle supported by the UN Charter and as such, articulated in the first article of the two major covenants of the UN – the ICCPR and ICESCR and many other human rights instruments.

De-facto States in various countries, waiting for recognition by UN member states, like Kosovo and the economically viable states like ROC, encourage other de-facto states to be more positive about their independence, recognition, stability and cooperation with states of their choice. UN membership is not an exclusive factor for independence, as has been seen. As far as countries in Europe are concerned, ’The land of the Alps’, Switzerland is another good example regarding the question of UN membership. Switzerland chose to become a member of the UN only in 2002. During the same period newly born Timor-Leste/East-Timor also became a member. Until then Switzerland had remained only as an Observer in the UN.

Greek and Turkish Controlled Areas of Cyprus

The political conflict between the two communities on the island began in 1878, when Greek Cypriots desired ENOSIS    ( Union with Greece ) and Turkish Cypriots rejected it. In 1955, Greek Cypriots had started an armed campaign of terror in order to unite the island with Greece , while Turkish Cypriots rejected and resided the colonization by Greece . Therefore, by having Turkey, Greece, and Great Britain as the guarantor powers, the International Treaties of 1960, named the Republic of Cyprus , and gave Cyprus its independence from Great Britain . It was thought to be a good compromise as it guaranteed a permanent settlement. It is the London-Zurich Treaties of February 1959, which gave Cyprus its independence but still it was not a full one. It guaranteed ‘that the two communities should be co-founder partners with equal political rights; that communal matters would be in the autonomous domain of elected communal chambers; that there would be no fear and no likelihood of one community dominating the other’. The 1960 partnership Republic was, for the sake of self-preservation, not a fully independent Republic. The international treaties of 1960, by prohibiting Enosis or Partition, restricted the independence of Cyprus . Not a nation, but a bi-national partnership state was created in 1960.

However, shortly after the founding of the Republic, serious differences arose between the two communities about the implementation and interpretation of the constitution. The Greek Cypriots argued that the complex mechanisms introduced to protect Turkish Cypriot interests were obstacles to efficient government. On 30 November 1963 , President Makarios advanced a series of constitutional amendments designed to eliminate some of these special provisions named “13 Points”. The Turkish Cypriots opposed such changes. The confrontation prompted widespread intercommunal fighting in December 1963, after which Turkish Cypriot participation in the central government ceased.

On March 4, 1964 , after the brutal Greek Cypriot attacks on the Turkish Cypriot community, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution (186), which provided stationing a United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The aim was “to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.

Although the Republic of Cyprus, founded in 1960, ended in 1963, when the Greek organs of government, administration and legislation proceeded to disregard the Turkish participatory rights as guaranteed by the Constitution of 1960, in the same resolution mentioned above (Resolution 186 of 1964), UN Security Council referred to the Government of Cyprus in a way which implied that the government manned only now by the Greek Cypriots, was the legitimate Government of Cyprus. Since then, the Greek Cypriots continue to usurp the titles of the bi-communal state. In fact, they are ‘the government of a state whose territory is restricted to the southern part of Cyprus and whose people are restricted to the Greek Cypriots living there’ (Heinze, 1997: 187). The Republic of Cyprus of today was created when between 1963 and 1974, Greek organs of the Republic of Cyprus and parts thereof and new organs founded by these or by Greek Cypriots, seized power over a part of the island’s territory in a revolutionary process. They ceased to recognize fundamental parts of the Constitution of Cyprus of 1960 and …separated themselves, and the Greek community from the Republic of Cyprus (Heinze, 1997: 188-89).

Unfortunately, the arrival of UNFICYP did not prevent Greek attacks on Turkish Cypriots and 1964-1974 period had been a harsh period for the Turkish side. For them, those years were marked by injustice, oppression, violence and discrimination. In 1967, the situation deteriorated, when a military junta seized power in Greece . In that year, Greek Cypriot House of Representatives unanimously passed a resolution, declaring that their struggle in Cyprus will continue until the union of Cyprus with Greece is achieved and they continued their attacks against Turkish Cypriots to force them to accept ENOSIS. No effort of UNFICYP was enough to halt the Greek Cypriot atrocities.

All these events forced the Turkish Cypriots to organize their own national administration and this resulted in establishing the provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration, on  December 28, 1967 . Up to the year 1974, both communities led a political life of their own.

In 1974, the attempted genocide against the Turkish Cypriots was repeated once more. On July 15, 1974 , a coup d’etat, led by Greek officers took place. The coup was organized by the military junta then ruling Greece , with the aim of overthrowing Makarios, the President of the Republic of Cyprus , and setting up a government, that would unite the island with Greece .

The island's British administration which began in 1878 proved an important influence on the history of Cyprus until its independence in 1960.

Following Cypriot independence, the British Sovereign Base areas of Akrotiri and Dekhelia remain under complete British control.

Official country name: Republic of Cyprus
Area: 3,571 sq miles (9,251 sq km)
Population: 796,740 (July 2009 est.)
Median age: 35.5
Ethnic Groups: Greek 77%, Turkish 18%, other 5%
GDP and GDP per capita: $26 billion and $27,800 (2007 estimates)

In 2008, the Republic has officially adopted the Euro as the currency of Cyprus. On May 1, 2009, Cyprus took another step to full integration into the European Union and its laws. It was not always this way – Cyprus has a tumultuous history since the start of British rule in 1878.

Since coming under British administration at the Ottoman Empire’s request, the history of Cyprus has seen some turbulent times. From the war between Turkey and Russia, through two world wars, a lengthy struggle for independence and the infamous Turkish invasion of 1974, Cyprus has endured violent wars.

Last December, Human Rights Watch urged the European Rule of Law mission in Kosovo to investigate and prosecute ethnic crimes. Doing so carves a path for the remedy of the major structural deficiencies in the justice system.

Human Rights Watch also urged the new mission to put pressure on Kosovo authorities to investigate recent credible allegations that Serbs and other prisoners were transferred to Albania in 1999. While the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has begun an inquiry, Kosovo authorities have categorically refused to investigate, despite the gravity of the accusations, and are unlikely to act without a clear signal from the EU that they should proceed

.http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/16/kosovo-ethnic-crimes

Celebrating Independence

Since 2006,  the international community has struggled with the question of whether Kosovo should become a sovereign state or remain an autonomous part of Serbia. Why then,  with almost two years of  “independence,” does Kosovo seem to still have a hard time gaining recognition?

The Kosovo status issue is complex, touching upon various levels of international concern including ethics of nationalism, the ability of the international community to engage in state-building and the setting of international legal precedents, to name a few. The result of this complexity is that various states agree and disagree, not always consistently, on the many issues related to Kosovo’s status, and this has slowed down the process of reaching agreement on status considerably.

Predominately, the United States and Russia are at the opposite ends of the spectrum, with the US advocating supervised independence and Russia unrelenting on the question of state inviolability in international law. The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy cannot seem to get off the ground at this point, due to the many differences among its 27 member states. Without a superpower that could impose a solution which no one could credibly oppose, the international community has a difficult diplomatic puzzle on its hands.

That reality has been recognized by a sufficient number of other states to justify its new status – 54 so far, including 22 of the European Union’s 27 member states. Kosovo’s diplomatic recognition is still unsatisfactorily incomplete.

Independence has been vociferously opposed by Serbia, despite the formation of a pro-EU coalition there last year. Russia has loudly supported them, warning that Kosovo sets secessionist precedents in Georgia and Moldova, of which it took full advantage. States like Spain are also fearful that their regional nationalisms will be emboldened by Kosovo.

There has been no renewed violence between majority and minority, but little or no reconciliation either. Most Serbs live in the northern city of Mitrovica, which relates to Belgrade not Pristina. About one-fifth live in scattered enclaves elsewhere, making them more inclined to pragmatic coexistence. Security is still maintained by 15,000 Nato-led troops and 3,000 EU-led police. Irish Army and Garda contingents have made a valuable contribution to these forces, which deserves greater recognition in our debates about peacekeeping.

Over the last year unemployment has remained very high and little has been done to encourage economic or social development, aside from international aid. There are hopeful signs that over time a gradual normalization of Serbia’s relations with the EU can help mitigate this picture by promising a long-term peace in the Balkan region – an essential condition for a stable Europe.

Map of Kosovo

With some background knowledge about Yugoslavia under my belt, it has made tackling the question of what is Kosovo much easier to understand. Kosovo is claimed by both the Albanians and the Serbs yet it’s “independence” made the front page of the New York Times on February 18, 2008

(http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/world/europe/18kosovo.html?_r=1&scp=7&sq=Kosovo+independence&st=nyt)

The Slavic and Albanian people have lived together since the 8th Century and it reminaed mostyly Serbian with Serbians regarding Kosov as their birthplace. Throughout the decades, Albanians began to dominate the population. Today, Kosovo is populated with about 90% Albanians yet the Serbs refuse to recognize its declaration depiste UN administration of independence.

Serbia’s defeat at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 ushered in centuries of rule under the Muslim Ottoman Empire. Serbia regained control of Kosovo in 1913, and the province was incorporated into the Yugoslav federation.

(In case you don’t remember everything about the break up of Yugoslavia, here is a little refresher: The two republics of Yugoslavia are Serbia and Montenegro. Serbia is a multi-ethnic state. Although it is a majority Serbian, there are many Albanian, Roma, Montenegrin, Bulgarian, Slovak, Croat and other nationalities living in Serbia. Kosovo is the only part of present-day Yugoslavia where there is any ethnic conflict).

Kosovo is an area a little smaller than Connecticut. It is entirely mountainous with two large valleys–Kosovo valley and Metohija valley. Kosovo is de facto an international protectorate but legally is part of Serbia. Its status remains the subject of a bitter dispute between the Albanian majority, who seek independence, and the minority Serbs. It is a dispute in which Belgrade retains a keen interest. UN-sponsored talks on the future status of Kosovo got under way in November 2, 2009.

On November 15, 2009, The New York Times featured an article stating that despite the corruption, low employment and poor infrastructure, the people of Kosovo hit the polls and participated in their first election since declaring independence from Serbia. “Kosovo’s Statehood Faces First Test At Local Polls,” http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2009/11/15/

Has it been successful with international recognition? So far 63 counties have recognized it as an independent state. Maybe if it demonstrate that is it going to be a fully functioning democracy – it will gain more international recognition. But it gets more complicated than that. Since achieving independence, unemployment is 40 percent and average per capita income is 1,760 euros. That compares with average joblessness of just under 10 percent in the European Union and an average salary of about 24,000 euros (21,000 pounds). Over the past decade, it has received 3 billion euros in aid but it needs more – more aid, more investment and significantly less corruption. In the heartland of the ethnic Albanian rebellion against Serb rule 10 years ago, people like Jonuzi and his ethnic Albanian family are among the 15 percent of Kosovo’s two million people living in extreme poverty, making less than 93 cents a day, according to the World Bank. Perhaps, if Kosovo can overcome these major hurdles, more and more countries will begin to recognize its “independence.”

The ethnic make up: Montenegrins represent 43% of the population; ethnic Serbs 32%, Bosnians’ (Slavic Muslims) about 10% and Albanians 5%. The “Serbs” fully identify as Serbs, while most of the “Montenegrins” do not, however, many partially do (’Montenegrin first, but still somehow ‘Serb’ second). Montenegrins and Serbs speak the same language, but so do Croats and Bosnians. While Croats are traditionally Catholic and Bosnians are Muslims, both Serbs and Montenegrins are Orthodox, giving them a closer connection.

While the divisions that were played out in the referendum on independence are not exclusively ‘ethnic’, it is predominant. The majority of ‘Serbs’ voted against independence, while, most of the Bosnians’ and Albanians voted for independence. The ’Montenegrins’ were more divided than the ‘Serbs’, with some still favoring the union, but the great majority voted for their own state at last.

Their 56% yes vote led P rime Minister Milo Djukanovic to say, “Tonight, with the majority decision by the citizens of Montenegro, the independence of the country has been renewed.” (BBC news)

At the time of the vote, the hope held both by locals and by foreign investors, was that independence from Serbia, leaving that country’s political isolation behind, will increase Montenegro’s access to foreign funds. Advocates of separating Montenegro from Serbia made the argument that foreign debt was higher in Serbia by one third and unemployment was significantly lower in Montenegro. Additionally, Serbia’s hesitation to cooperate with the Hague war crime tribunal with the ongoing Kosovo status proves and general political turmoil put a damper on foreign direct investment, attractiveness to investors and the delayed progress for full membership into the European Union and NATO.

With almost four years of independence, Montenegro is arguably better off.

Montenegro’s economy continues to transform into a more service-based one, with tourism as their main industry. Efforts have been made to attract the foreign investors into tourism green field investments, as well as in large infrastructure projects, both needed to facilitate the tourism development.

Montenegro has experienced a real estate boom in 2006 and 2007. Montenegro’s lovely location on the Adriatic Sea has attracted wealthy Russians and Britons, as well as others to buy property on the coast. In 2008, Montenegro received more foreign investment per capita than any other nation in Europe. The influx of foreign direct investment has allowed for the Montenegrin GDP to grow at a relatively strong rate of 7.5% in recent years.